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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING SYMPOSIUM
Critical Reflections on International and
National Control of Drugs
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug-related problems have reached a perceived crisis-level in many
consuming countries, particularly in the United States and other Western
European societies. The real crisis is a result of crimes committed in con-
nection with drug trafficking and by those engaged in the drug business,
as well as by users and abusers who commit crimes to support their drug
needs. Producing countries have also started to appreciate the extent of
social, economic and political problems resulting from cultivation, pro-
duction and consumption of drugs. Transit countries and countries used
for recycling of drug proceeds are also experiencing problems similar to
those of producing countries.
As a result, the multi-faceted and worldwide effects of drugs on the
social, economic and political well-being and stability of a number of
countries has reached a level of unprecedented international concern. The
1990 Special Session of the General Assembly on Drugs has evidenced
that concern.
International and national efforts in confronting this new phenome-
non, however, lag far behind the multi-faceted problems created by inter-
dependent cycles of production and consumption, including intermediate
stages of distribution, transportation, and recycling of funds, in addition
to secondary and tertiary consequences in social, health, political and eco-
nomic spheres.
Unfortunately, international and national responses aimed at com-
plete control of cultivation, production, traffic, use and abuse of drugs
* Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law; President, International Associ-
ation of Penal Law; President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences.
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have so far failed. Consuming societies cannot control consumption, and
producing states cannot control production. The essential reason is that
so long as there is demand, there will be supply and, mutatis mutandis,
so long as there is supply, it will generate demand. Furthermore, it should
also be recognized that supply will always find its way to demand. There
are indeed too many transit routes in the world to effectively intercept
the movement of drugs from producing to consuming countries.
The cumulative impact of these and other factors affecting the inter-
national community's ability to effectively control drugs requires a new,
critical appraisal of the international system of drug control and its predi-
cation on certain assumptions concerning the ability of national systems
of control to effectively fulfill their expected goals.
II. ASSESSING THE CONTROLS
A. The International System and Mechanisms of Control1
International efforts at controlling drugs began in 1912 when it ap-
peared that an estimated ten million Chinese had become opium addicts.'
The world community at that time sought to control the spread of opium
addiction making its way to the United States and Western Europe. Since
then, thirteen international instruments have been developed culminating
with the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances which was signed by eighty-nine states and rati-
fied by four states [as of January 15, 1990].'
1. 1 Bassiouni, The International Narcotics Control Scheme in 1 M. C. BASSIOUNI, IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 507 (1986). See also infra note 12.
2. International Opium Convention, The Hague, 23 Jan. 1912 (First International
Opium Conference), 8 L.N.T.S. 187, T.S. No. 612, reprinted in 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 177 (1912).
3. Id. and Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal
Trade in and Use of, Prepared Opium, Geneva, 11 Feb., 1925 (First Opium Conference of
the League of Nations), 51 U.N.T.S. 337; International Opium Convention, Geneva, 19 Feb.
1925 (Second Opium Conference of the League of Nations), 81 U.N.T.S. 356, reprinted in
23 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (1929); Convention for Limiting the Manufacture of Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, 13 July, 1931, 139 U.N.T.S. 301, T.S. No. 863, re-
printed in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. (1934); Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium-
Smoking, Bangkok, 27 Nov., 1931, 177 U.N.T.S. 373; Convention for the Suppression of the
Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Geneva, 26 June, 1946, 198 L.N.T.S., 299; Protocol
Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs Concluded at the
Hague on 23 Jan., 1912, at Geneva on 11 Feb., 1925 and 19 Feb., 1925, and 13 July, 1931, at
Bangkok on 27 Nov., 1931 at Geneva on 26 June, 1936, and at Lake Success, New York on
11 Dec., 1946, 12 U.N.T.S. 179, T.I.A.S. No. 1671; Protocol Bringing Under International
Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of 13 July, 1931 for Limiting the Manu-
facture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol of
11 Dec., 1946, Paris, 19 Nov., 1948, 44 U.N.T.S., 277, T.I.A.S. No. 2308; Protocol for Limit-
ing and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and
Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium (Opium Convention), New York, 23 June, 1942, 456
U.N.T.S., T.I.A.S. No. 5273; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Narcotics Conven-
tion), New York, 30 Mar., 1961, 520 U.N.T.S., 151 T.I.A.S. No. 6298; Convention on Psycho-
tropic Substances (Psychotropic Convention), Vienna, 21 Feb., 1971 (United Nations Con-
ference for the Adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, 11 Jan. thru 21 Feb.,
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The evolutionary process of international legislation has therefore
been consistent. At first, it dealt with opium because of its perceived dan-
gers in the Western societies of the United States and Europe. Gradually,
however, the range of concerns encompassed other types of naturally
based drugs such as the coca derivatives and various types of cannabis
sativa (marijuana, hashish, quat, and indian hemp).
Until 1971, the thrust of international controls was by the consuming
countries of the West over the producing ones of the Third World. This
occurred because consuming countries experienced social problems as a
result of consumption, whereas the producing Third World countries had
no such social problems. The latter derived economic benefits from the
cultivation and traffic of naturally produced drugs. But the consuming
countries' rationale was that ultimately the problems of drug consump-
tion would spread to the producing countries. They argued that economic
dependence on drug-related profits would create economic, social and po-
litical problems for producing countries. Thus, international cooperation
was deemed indispensable for the world community as a whole. These
arguments are as valid today as they were fifty years ago.
Notwithstanding these predictions, consuming countries of the West
have failed to provide the necessary assistance for economic development
to Third World producing countries, and production of drugs has contin-
ued to increase. Gradually the consuming countries used treaties to place
expanded international controls on the producing countries. At first, ef-
forts were aimed at curtailing and later eliminating the cultivation of nat-
ural drugs. As a result, the producing countries had to bear additional
costs in law enforcement and divert vital resources to carry out these
obligations.
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is today the most
universally accepted Convention in the field of drug control." It is, after
the United Nations Charter and the four Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949,' the multilateral treaty with the largest number of State-Parties.
1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, T.I.A.S. No. 9725, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 261 (1971); Protocol
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, at Geneva, 25 Mar., 1972 (United
Nations Conference to Consider Amendments to the Single Convention on Drugs, 1961, 6-25
Mar. 1972), 976 U.N.T.S. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 804 (1972); United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
19 Dec. 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15. (See Comment, 29 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1988)).
Two other international conventions prohibit traffic in drugs: the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 29 Apr., 1958 (United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 24 Feb. through 27 Apr., 1958), 516 U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. No. 5639;
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay Convention), Montego Bay, 10 Dec., 1982
(Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122,
reprinted in 21 1. L. M. 1261 (1982).
4. See supra note 3; Status of Multilateral Treaties on Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances that are Deposited with the Secretary General (United Nations Economic
and Social Council, 23 Dec., 1983), E/CN.7/1984/9.
5. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in the Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, T.I.A.S. No. 3362;
1990
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However, by 1970 it was obvious that the 1961 Single Convention needed
to be strengthened in order to make it more effective. By 1970, the pro-
cess began by which the 1961 Single Convention would be amended, ulti-
mately culminating in the 1972 Protocol Amending the 1961 Single
Convention.'
During that same period, the international community came to the
realization that some specific controls over chemical and pharmaceutical
drugs should also be established. While efforts to amend the 1961 Single
Convention to strengthen it were ongoing, a parallel effort was under-
taken to develop another convention which ultimately became the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.7 These two efforts which should
have logically been integrated into a single convention proceeded along
separate paths.
The international community at that time was divided between con-
suming and producing countries of natural drugs and of chemical and
pharmaceutical ones. However, that division did not represent identical
parties. With respect to the natural drugs, most of the producing coun-
tries, as stated above, were and still are, Third World developing coun-
tries. While the consuming ones were, and still are, the industrialized
Western countries. With respect to the chemical and pharmaceutical
drugs, however, the producing countries were, and still are, mostly the
Western industrialized countries (as well as other industrialized countries
of Eastern Europe, but they were less active on the international market-
ing arena) while the consuming countries include the Third World devel-
oping countries. In short, the main consumption of natural drugs was in
the industrialized West, while consumption of chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal drugs included the developing countries.
While the developed countries of the West desired to impose strong
controls over the cultivation, production and traffic of natural drugs
originating in the developing countries, they were unwilling to impose the
same types of controls over their own chemical and pharmaceutical indus-
tries.' Because of that imbalance, the obligations of consuming and pro-
ducing countries (which are largely derived from their relative power po-
sitions and their social and economic condition) affected the 1972
Amending Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs9 by
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12
Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Related to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365.
6. Supra note 3.
7. Supra notes 3 and 4.
8. This also extends to chemicals needed to manufacture drugs deriving from natural
products, see Are Chemical Makers A WOL in the War on Drugs? Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1988,
at 80.
9. See Commentary on the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, United Nations
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producing a much stronger system of control than the one established by
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances."0
The imbalance that exists between these two systems of control has
not yet been redressed. One of the reasons for this situation is that
throughout the world a pattern of behavior in chemical drug consumption
has become part of daily life. The widespread habituation to the taking of
drugs from benign aspirin, cold tablets or vitamins, has generated a cul-
ture of pill-taking, which made it much easier and more acceptable to
take other types of pills, even though they produce harmful effects. The
taking of one pill as opposed to another may be a question of slight differ-
ence. This situation made social and legal controls of psychotropic sub-
stances more difficult than the control of natural drugs. The type of social
and legal controls that derive from a generally unacceptable pattern of
behavior involving injecting heroin or snorting cocaine is obviously easier
than that of controlling the taking of pills whose apparent use is generally
accepted behavior if for no other reason than the difference in the color
or shape of the pill is not a significantly distinguishing factor to make it
socially reprehensible."
The differences in patterns of socially acceptable, as opposed to so-
cially unacceptable behavior, as well as what may merge into legitimacy
and what may readily appear to be outside social legitimacy, tend to
make the disparity in the international perception of the dangers of
drugs, as well as the ensuing control mechanism, less readily observable.
As a result, what we see is a strong imbalance in the attempt to control
the natural drugs in contrast to the chemical and pharmaceutical ones.
It must also be pointed out that the originators of the international
narcotics control system were not promoting the complete control of the
drugs by eliminating the cultivation of what are called "illicit drugs." Be-
cause the international system still recognizes the legitimacy and legal
validity of the cultivation of drugs, they are deemed licit if cultivated
under the monopoly or control of a state. 12 The international narcotics
control system, as well as the system of national control, is one that
grants a monopoly of cultivation and processing of natural drugs to the
states. The reason is due to the medical purposes of such natural drugs,
as in the case of morphine. However, it nonetheless appears incongruous
to have a co-existence of a licit system of cultivation and processing
under the monopoly of a given state, as well as a licit system for traffick-
E.73 XI.1 (1973).
10. See Commentary on the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, United Na-
tions, E/CN. 7/589 (1976).
11. See Psychoactive Drug Control: Issues and Recommendations, International Re-
search Group on Drug Legislation and Programs, United Nations Social Defence Research
Institute, S.P. No. 5 (1973).
12. Bogaard, International Control of the Legitimate Trade in Narcotic Drugs, 3
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 97 (1972); P.D. LowEs, THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CON-
TROL (1966).
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ing by the state and by chemical and pharmaceutical companies through
the dispensing of drugs for valid medical and therapeutic purposes, while
at the same time deeming illicit the production and traffic of these sub-
stances when they are not under the control of the state and outside state
regulation for use. While there is no doubt that a valid distinction exists
between what is licit for medical purposes and what is not, it is essen-
tially a qualitative and judgmental distinction. This does not have the
same social and socio-psychological impact as banning the cultivation of
all drugs because they are malum in se.
An alternative to the existing scheme can easily be conceived
whereby all natural drugs - the opium poppy, the coca bush, the canna-
bis sativa - could be banned throughout the world and their eradication
collectively decreed by the world community; and in order to provide for
morphine and other drugs which derive from the opiates, the United Na-
tions could assign the task of limited cultivation of such a crop to a given
country for the benefit of all other countries. In short, an opium poppy
farm could be established in a given country under international control
and would probably require no more than a thousand hectares to satisfy
the world's medical needs. Such cultivation could easily be internationally
controlled and there would not be the problem of having different coun-
tries grow these crops under local controls to produce that which is osten-
sibly for their pharmaceutical needs. Experience has clearly indicated
that in almost every country where licit cultivation exists there is a por-
tion of it that goes into illicit traffic. There is also no reason why, on such
a simple subject, the world community could not agree to abolish cultiva-
tion everywhere in the world in order to concentrate it in a single plot of
land and develop a worldwide consortium. The costs of such licit cultiva-
tion would certainly be low. And there would be no genuine economic
interest on the part of different countries - interested in purchasing
their needs for legitimate pharmaceutical production - to claim that
such a monopoly concentration of the cultivation in one country would
effect them detrimentally. The cultivation of a single hectare of the
opium poppy would cost approximately $500 to $800 per crop. Even if we
assume an inflated cost of $1000 per hectare, the production of 1000 hect-
ares would only be $1 million per year. If the total needs of the world
community in producing morphine based drugs is a total cost of $1 mil-
lion for the poppy, there is simply no legitimate economic reason to pre-
vent it.
That such an idea has not taken root, even though it has been sug-
gested, at least by this writer since 1971,13 is evidence that an interna-
tional control effort does not necessarily evidence the will of states to
fully cooperate at all levels.
13. Bassiouni, The International Narcotics Control Scheme - A Proposal, 46 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 713 (1977) and Bassiouni, International Aspects of Drug Abuse: Problems
and a Proposal, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. PROc. 3 (1975).
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The international narcotics control system, as stated above, is predi-
cated on a licit system of cultivation and production and only those activ-
ities which exceed the licit quota system become illicit.1 4 Under such a
system states may produce based on their estimated needs, and could ex-
port the surplus to other states based on an import/export certification
system. But, in the final analysis, such a system would depend almost
entirely on voluntary international cooperation. Without direct interna-
tional controls it rests only on the ability of those international organiza-
tions that supervise such a system to denounce a potential violator to the
world community.
In addition to the above, the international narcotics control system is
predicated on an indirect control system, by which states undertake cer-
tain international obligations arising out of treaty obligations and then
assume the task of carrying them out through their national legal system
in reliance upon their national implementation measures. 5
In a sense it is almost incongruous to think that an international sys-
tem, which presumably would operate at the top of the pyramid in the
structure of states, ultimately winds up distributing enforcement powers
to the bottom of the pyramid, namely to the participating states. Under
the present system, international structures established to control drugs
are designed only as administrative support, funding, or as monitoring
organizations, without any effective enforcement powers.
These various international organs are:'6
1. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,17 was estab-
lished in 1946 by the Economic and Social Council as the policy-mak-
ing body of the United Nations system with respect to drug matters.
Its membership consists of forty members elected by the Economic
and Social Council and it reviews the overall global drug situation and
prepares policies, as well as sponsoring international conventions.
2. The United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs' 8 essentially serves
as the administrative body, the secretariat and executive arm of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. It assists members in the implemen-
tation of the various drug Conventions and provides services and fa-
cilities to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. It publishes annual and
analytical reports, as well as various national reports required by in-
ternational treaties, and deals with coordinating the work of the
United Nations and World Health Organization, as well as various
14. Supra notes 1 and 12.
15. Supra notes 1, 12 - 13. This is the case with respect to all international crimes. See
e.g., 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES (1986) and M.C. BASSIOUNi,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (1985).
16. See Declaration of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffick-
ing and Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Con-
trols (United Nations, 1988) which describes the functions of all United Nations Agencies in
this field.
17. Id. The Commission also publishes annual reports.
18. Id.
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governments.
3. The International Narcotics Control Board1 (INCB) was estab-
lished under the provision of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs. It was established to limit the cultivation, production, manu-
facture and use of drugs to the adequate amounts required for medi-
cal and scientific purposes. In short, it is the body that establishes the
quotas for countries, based on their estimates of need for the chemical
and scientific licit purposes. The Board consists of thirteen members
elected from the State-Parties. These members serve ostensibly in
their personal capacity, but in reality they are genuine government
representatives. The INCB works closely with the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs and cooperates with other bodies, such as the World
Health Organization and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control. But it must be clearly understood that such cooperative un-
dertakings are purely dependent upon the will of the Board. What is
particularly interesting is that this Board is created by treaty and op-
erates with total and complete independence from the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs.
4. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control 0 (UNFDAC) is
the only multilateral body which was created to provide technical as-
sistance as well as funding relating to crop substitution. In recent
times, it has evolved from that narrow role of being a funding agency
to one that provides technical assistance for all forms of drug abuse
and illicit trafficking, including the field of law enforcement. It was
created in 1971 by the Secretary-General and was established as a
multilateral body to which a number of countries voluntarily contrib-
ute. Because contributions to UNFDAC are voluntary, the projects it
undertakes are dependent upon such voluntary contributions of those
different countries. UNFDAC operates subject to the control of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, but it does not have any
obligation to either work or, in fact, cooperate or correlate its activi-
ties with the other bodies mentioned above, just as these other bodies
have no obligation towards each other.
In addition to these four main bodies, we find that there are several
other agencies within the United Nations that deal with drugs. The
World Health Organization is mandated under the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances to provide advice on the chemical and pharma-
ceutical substances that would fall in the four schedules of drugs estab-
lished under the terms of the Convention. The Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Branch of the United Nations also deals with the crime-
related aspects of drugs. The Center for Human Rights has certain ad-
ministrative tasks with respect to human rights dimensions related to
drugs. In that respect, two other United Nations bodies also are directly
involved, namely The Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommit-
tee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities be-
19. Id.
20. Id., The United Nations Fund For Drug Abuse Control (1987).
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cause of their mandate in human rights-related aspects of drug use and
abuse. In addition, all the United Nations bodies involved in the area of
human rights deal also with criminal justice and law enforcement insofar
as there are human rights issues. This, of course, extends to illicit traffick-
ing in drugs.
As a result, it is clear that the international structures that have been
established to deal with the problems of drugs are compartmentalized
and without effective power. Again, one must marvel at the reasons why
the international community would create such a diversity of organiza-
tions, each working under different bureaucratic headings at the interna-
tional level, with separate functions. Little wonder that efforts at control-
ling both the licit and illicit cultivation, traffic, distribution and use of
drugs has not been successful. This raises the question of whether the
international community is genuinely interested in the control of the cul-
tivation, manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs, or whether it is
merely seeking to express its disapproval of these activities, but unwilling
or unable to undertake the necessary steps to make that concern
effective.
B. The Assumptions Underlying International and National Controls
1. Assessment of Supply and Consumption21
It is clear to anyone interested in the subject that there is no ade-
quate way of quantitatively and qualitatively assessing both the supply
and the consumption of drugs throughout the world. With respect to sup-
ply, the assessment is based on an extrapolation of figures predicated on
the amount of drugs seized and a very loose correlation between the num-
ber of arrests and seizures of drugs in different countries and the esti-
mated linkage between these arrests on the one hand and supply and con-
sumption on the other. The supply side of drugs has been consistently
increasing over the past fifty years and there is no way to assess how
much more it can increase or where such increase will come from.
The problem of assessment is the same on the consumption side. In
the United States,22 for example, the estimates of occasional cocaine users
fluctuates between the figure of under 800,000 up to the figure of
5,000,000. The fluctuation in numbers between the users of marijuana
range from 1,000,000 to 5,000,000.23 The estimated number of heroin
users fluctuates from 300,000 to 800,000. The same uncertainty exists in
most countries where the estimated number of users, depending upon the
type of drugs, varies enormously. There is also a large discrepancy be-
21. See International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, Mar., 1989).
See also appendix regarding United Nations released figures.
22. Id.
23. Decker, The Official Report of the National Commission Studying Marijuana:
More Misunderstanding, 8 U.S. F. L. REv. 1 (1973).
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tween the estimates of occasional users of the cannabis sativa derivative
and those of cocaine and coca bush product derivatives.
It is therefore astonishing that the assumptions derived from both
the supply and the consumption of drugs are predicated on figures which
are so tenuous and uncertain. Surely, if the total number of heroin ad-
dicts in the United States was 300,000 and the total number of cocaine
users was less than 800,000, the dimension of the problem would be much
different than if the higher of the estimated figures were to be taken into
account. The same is true for many countries where certainty as to the
number of regular users and occasional users is almost totally absent.
What is probably worse in terms of assumptions is the fact that no
estimates exist as to the potential capabilities in various parts of the
world for additional supply. This might be because few governments are
willing to admit the fact that capacity for supply cannot be controlled, let
alone eliminated. There is a limitless capacity of supply.2 4 Thus, for ex-
ample, if it is believed that the eradication of the coca bush in Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru would eliminate the problem of cocaine supply, one
would have to realize that this conclusion is entirely wrong because simi-
lar geographic and weather conditions may exist, not only in the Andes,
but also in the Amazon area of Brazil, in the Indian subcontinent, in the
Philippines and in Indonesia. The fact is that coca is already cultivated in
all these areas.
These considerations must also be viewed in light of potential expan-
sion of cultivation and increased production in presently producing and
consuming countries. An enormous potential for increased cultivation and
production in many states not presently producing also exists. Further-
more, increased use and abuse in producing and consuming countries and
further potential increase of use and abuse in almost all countries of the
world, is a realistic hypothesis that must be taken into consideration
when assessing the extent of the problem.
The spread of cultivation in consuming countries to meet the needs
of the demand is already well established. Marijuana, for example, is now
extensively produced in the United States and, according to some esti-
mates, domestic production is now fulfilling 25% of the needs of U.S.
consumption.
If supply cannot be controlled, because there will always be a poten-
tial for supply somewhere, how can it be expected that international and
national controls can be effective? The assumptions made by both inter-
national and national policy-makers are predicated on two erroneous fac-
tual assumptions of production and consumption and of supply and de-
mand. Without adequate knowledge of these figures, it is quite logical to
conclude that the consequences derived from any assumed figures will
lead to erroneous outcomes.
24. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, supra note 21. This is a reasona-
ble projection from the figures indicated previously.
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2. The Profit Motive
The supply side of drugs is essentially a world-wide business enter-
prise which the United Nations estimates to be "a $500 billion per year
business."2" Those who engage in it do so for profit and no other reason,
save possibly for some ideologically motivated group seeking to finance its
illegal activities from such revenue sources."6
In some cases, those active in the supply side form monopolies of
cultivation and exportation, such as in the case of the successor Chinese
warlords of the Golden Triangle of Burma-Thailand-Laos, and in the case
of Columbia. In Columbia, the Medellin and Cali cartels control cultiva-
tion, production and export and also control certain aspects of production
and exports from other countries like Bolivia and Peru. These cartels
have also developed vertically-integrated business enterprises whereby
the cartel's direct control reaches the levels of distribution in other con-
suming societies, such as in the United States where the Columbia cartels
operate in Florida and other parts of the country. Probably the most ex-
traordinary reach of such organizations has been to secure the support of
a state through its dictator, as in the case of Panama's General Noriega."
In that case, the control or neutralization of state organs allowed not only
the use of that country as a transit point, but also as a base from which to
recycle drug proceeds. Situations like that may still occur in any of the
many states with a small population whose economic needs might find it
profitable to provide some type of safe haven for production transit or
recycling of proceeds.
Other types of organized crime, like the Italian Mafia and Camorra,
control production of heroin and export of both heroin and cocaine to the
25. See Drug Trafficking and the World Economy, United Nations Department of
Public Information, Document DPI/1040B-40076, January 1990, 12M, at 1. U.N. DOC. DPI/
1040B-40076 (1990).
26. See A. Beria di Argentine, Relazione del Procuratore Generale per
L'Inaugurazione dell'Anno Giudiziario 1989 (Corte d'Appello di Milano, 14 Jan. 1989) at
69, who links certain forms of terrorism and organized crime. A similar position is taken by
Wardlow, Linkages Between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism, 8 CONFLICT Q. 5
(1988).
Links between organized crime and terrorism is one of the topics of the forthcoming
Eighth United National Congress on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
to be held in Havana, Cuba, Aug.-Sept. 1990. See UNPOC A/CONF. 144/P.M. 1 and the
Report of the Interregional Preparatory Meeting for the Eighth United Nations Congress on
Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders, and Report of M.C. Bassiouni, Effective
National and International Action Against Organized Crime, and Terrorist Criminal Ac-
tivities, A/CONF. 144 P.M. 1, 11 Apr., (1988), reprinted in 4 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 9.
27. See United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Ter-
rorism, Narcotics and International Communications and International Economic Policy.
Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: Panama: Hearings pt. 2, February 8-11, 1988.
100th Cong., 2d Ses., Senate Hearing 100-773/pt. 2. (SD cat. no. Y/4.F/76/2:S.hrg. 1-773/pt.
2). See also Rosenblum,supra note 26, wherein he refers to hearings and investigations by
this Sub-Committee on U.S. officials having connections with foreign military and other
drug traffickers.
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United States and Western European states. This is due to the groups'
far-reaching power and influence in many segments of the societies where
they operate. Some states, like Italy28 and the United States,29 have en-
acted strong legislation to counteract these manifestations, including for-
feiture of assets provisions. It is paramount to understand that the profit
motive drives the supply side of drugs as much as profit drives any legiti-
mate business enterprise. Thus, the key to controlling the entire drug
business is to control its profits." Though that alone, even if possible, can
never become a panacea for the many aspects of the problem. Further-
more, it is self-evident that reduction of demand and supply are indispen-
sable to reduce profit-making.
An example of the international community's inability or unwilling-
28. For Italy's anti-Mafia and organized crime confiscation laws, see Italian Penal Code,
art. 240, which provides for confiscation of proceeds of crime by judgment of a criminal
court after conviction. The "Anti-Mafia" Law No. 646 of Sept. 13, 1982 provides for confis-
cation of proceeds belonging to persons suspected of being part of a Mafia-like criminal
organization which, includes persons who are part of a group living off criminal proceeds
such as kidnapping. Other confiscations following convictions under Law No. 646 are in the
nature of those provided for by Article 240 of the Italian Penal Code. Also, Article 648 bis,
of the Italian Penal Code applies to money laundering and permits (in connection with art.
240) its confiscation.
29. The United States enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Statute, Title 18, U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, which allows for 20 year penalties, forfeiture and civil
remedies for numerous crimes (normally subject to lesser penalties) if committed as part of
a pattern of activity. Various crimes have been added to the enumerated list since the stat-
ute was enacted in 1970, and now include murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, theft from interstate commerce, embez-
zlement from unions or from employee pension or welfare funds, extortion of loans and
collections, fraud by mail or other interstate means, obstruction of investigations or court
proceedings, public corruption, witness intimidation or retaliation, prohibited payments to
influence union officials, money laundering and illegal property, trafficking in contraband
cigarettes, interstate prostitution, and obscenity offenses. It should be noted that this enu-
meration is due in part to the peculiar federal structure of United States law wherein all
crime is within the competence of State governments and the Federal government exercises
competence only when national or interstate interests are implicated. See also 18 U.S.C. §
1963 and art. 416 bis, Italian Penal Code (forfeiture of criminal proceeds, interests, licenses
and contracts). The United Kingom has also enacted the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of
1986 which deals essentially with confiscation of proceeds (§ 1) and investigation of drug
trafficking activities (§§ 27-33). See also, for France, Loi No. 86-1020 Relative to Combat-
ting Terrorism, arts. 44, 257-3, 462, 463-1, and 463-2 of the French Penal Code; and Ot-
tenhof, Le Droit Pnal Frangois & l'Epreuve du Terrorism, 1987 REVUE DE SCIENCE
CRIMINELLE 607 and MERLE & VITU, TRAIT9 DE DROIT CRIMINAL 273 (6th ed. 1989). For
Spain see Law 1988-3 of 26 Dec., 1984 and Law 1988-4 of 25 May, 1988; and J.L. de la
Cuesta, Traitement Juridique du Terrorism en Espagne, 1987 REVUE DE SCIENCE
CRIMINELLE 589.
30. See The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money
Laundering, President's Commission on Organized Crime (1984). Recently the Council of
Europe prepared a Draft Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of
the Proceeds of Crime, PC-R-SC (90) 8 Rev., 25 Apr., 1990, European Committee on Crime
Problems. This text incorporates some of the provisions on confiscation of proceeds of crime
intended in the 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 3.
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ness to effectively cooperate is in the area of financial controls.3 ' Finan-
cial controls over the entry into the financial circuit of drug proceeds has
proven almost impossible, notwithstanding some occasional successes.8 2
The bank secrecy laws of so many countries make the tracing of drug
proceeds more difficult. To sort out the white, black and gray money that
flows through the financial system is next to impossible. Money, as the
saying goes, has no odor and thus cannot be closely detected once it en-
ters into the legitimate financial pipeline. Thereafter the investments
made with such proceeds are even harder to retrace. The conclusion is
that in the absence of a worldwide uniform system of financial control of
all funds entering the legitimate financial pipeline, no effective controls
can be expected even though some countries, like Switzerland, have made
progress in curbing bank secrecy laws."3 This situation leaves the profit
incentive in drugs significantly unaffected by occasional seizures of drug
proceeds.
The profits of the drug business have attracted all sorts of offenders
from solo operators, such as users supporting their habits to major world-
wide organizations. Among such organizations, some, like the Mafia, span
countries and continents - their adherents reaching into all strata of dif-
ferent societies. Drug profits also fund these organizations, allowing them
to conduct other criminal activities and buy corrupting political influence.
The impact of these profits do more to corrupt social systems, damage
economies and weaken moral and ethical values than the combined ef-
31. Bassiouni, Financial Controls and Drug Profits, Chicago Trib., Sept. 22, 1988, § 1
at 20, col. 1.
32. See Nadelmann, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: U.S. Foreign Policy and Fi-
nancial Secrecy Jurisdictions, 18 INTERAMERICAN L. REV. 23 (1986). For a discussion of the
role of international organizations in the enforcement of international money laundering, see
Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement and Related
Matters - A United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J. OF INT'L L. & ECON. 465 (1990);
Zagaris and Papavizas, Using the Organization of American States to Control Interna-
tional Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REV. INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 119
(1986); for a discussion of the role of regional organizations see Zagaris, Inter-American
Drug Abuse Commission Progresses on Legal Development Project, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 186 (1988); Zagaris, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission Holds 3rd
Session, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 114 (1988). For the problems of tax evasion and
international enforcement see Pansius, Tax Evasion and Extraterritorial Discovery, in IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 105, (V.P. Nanda
and M.C. Bassiouni eds. 1987).
33. In 1987, the Swiss Bankers Association and its member banks developed new rules
and practices on limiting bank secrecy. This agreement takes into account art. 52, § 3 of the
Swiss Civil Code concerning companies or legal entities having an unlawful, illicit or im-
moral scope. For a study on Swiss banking violations see Bernasconi, Banques et Delin-
quence Economique: 50 Judgments, in REVISION BANCAIRE (2nd rev. ed. 1988); and Bernas-
coni, Le Recyclage de l'Argent d'Origine Criminelle, 4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
CRIMINOLOGIE ET DE POLICE TECHNIQUE 403 (1981); H. SCHULTZ, LE SECRET BANCAIRE ET LE
TRAIT9 D'ENTRAIDE JUDICAIE EN MATIERI P9NALE CONCLU ENTR LA SUISSE ET LES ETATS
UNIS D'AMERIQUE (1976). For a Council of Europe study see Secrecy and Openness: Individ-
uals, Enterprises and Public Administrators, Proceedings of the Seventeenth European
Colloquium, Zargoza, Spain, 21-23 Oct. 1987.
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fects of all other forms of crime.
The quick and easy profits from drug trafficking have also attracted
organizations and groups dedicated to the pursuit of ideological goals
through strategies of violence. Whether by direct involvement in drug
trafficking or by extending their protection to those primarily involved in
the drug business, such organizations have found it lucrative enough to
partake in drug profits, thus expanding the harm to societies. The cor-
rupting reach into government officials, politicians and the business com-
munity further endangers the stability of societies and governmental
processes, and ultimately threaten political stability and even world
order.
3. The Weaknesses of the National Systems"4
In addition to the above, one must also consider the weaknesses of
the various national law enforcement and criminal justice systems.
Within each state there are administrative divisions and bureaucracies
which frequently operate in sealed compartments, and at times even com-
pete with each other, resulting in the weakening of the national enforce-
ment systems. The administration of criminal justice in every country
does not operate as a single cohesive system. All criminal justice systems
have at least four sub-systems: law enforcement, prosecution, judiciary
and corrections. Each one of these is frequently divided into further
smaller and sometimes competing units. The levels of integration and co-
operation between the sub-systems and units of the criminal justice sys-
tem are usually limited, and as stated above, they also suffer from the
syndromes of competition. These organizational difficulties are also at
times aggravated by internal political considerations, personal jealousies,
animosities and ambitions, which at times seem to supersede institutional
and national interests. The drug business, however, no matter how seg-
mented it may be, does not have to operate under such constraints. The
national criminal justice systems are presumed to work as a barrier to
criminal activity. When it comes to the drug business, however that sys-
tem resembles a net whose webs are large enough to allow the fish to
swim through it uncaught and unscathed.
The free enterprise type of activity that characterizes the drug busi-
ness is also free of the bureaucracies that hamstring national and interna-
tional agencies seeking to control the problem. Thus, while states rigidly
observe the confines of their territorial jurisdiction, those in the drug bus-
iness do not, and that permits them to exploit to their benefit the juris-
dictional and operational gaps in inter-state cooperation.
34. See Bassiouni, Criminal Justice Processes and Perspectives in a Changing World,
Report to the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 121 NGO/36.
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4. Connections Between the Drug Business and Other Criminal
Activities3"
In recent times, some reports indicate a nexus between terrorism,
drug trafficking and arms dealing. The logic of such linkages is self-evi-
dent, though there is insufficient reliable data on such linkages between
specific groups. Some data emerged linking the M-19 Group of Columbia,
and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru, with drug traffic, while
linkages between Castro's secret service and revolutionary organizations
also disclosed profit-related linkages with the Medellin Cartel and Gen-
eral Noriega of Panama. Similarly, reports in Italy indicate some linkages
between the Mafia and foreign and local illicit arms dealers, and between
the Mafia and some organizations engaging in terrorist violence. All these
linkages add new dimensions of social, economic and political dangers to
a number of countries and to the stability of the international
community.
5. Economic Aspects
On the economic plane, certain developing societies whose economies
depend on the financial flow of drug-related resources find their econo-
mies gradually crippled as their dependency on drug income increases be-
cause their other productive means which are less profitable diminish.
This is particularly true of agricultural societies, such as Bolivia and Peru
for whose campesinos the growing of the coca bush is more profitable and
less painstaking than, for example, growing coffee or raising livestock.
Such a choice is, however, also dictated by the lack of developmental ca-
pabilities and weaknesses in the infrastructure of these countries. This
situation is a vicious cycle: the production of drugs flourishes in underde-
veloped economies, while also preventing development - one problem
feeding upon the other."
The same phenomenon also extends to developing transit states
where the income from handling the flow of drugs and recycling its pro-
ceeds provides easy and quick profits which detrimentally affect the sta-
bility of their economic system. Thus, the economic viability of such
states, and hence the social, economic and political stability, are
imperiled.
Surprisingly, however, international and national efforts at curtailing
supply and cutting off transit routes have not focused on the rather obvi-
35. See supra notes 26-27. See also Proceedings of the Eighty-First Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law on Drugs and Small Arms: Can Law Stop the
Traffic? pp. 44-59, comments of Blakesley, Penney, Nadelmann, and Zagaris (1987).
36. La Cuesti6n de las Drogas en America Latina, Comission Nacional Contra el Uso
Ilicite de las Drogas, Venezuela (1987). See also Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine:
The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wisc. L. REV. 1305, and Nadelmann,
Latinoam~rica: economia politica del comercio de cocaina, 9 UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES 27
(1986).
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ous need to offer economic development assistance in a significant and
comprehensive manner to these developing countries. Production of drugs
in developing countries can be measured in direct relationship to the
world economy and consequently to the specific national economies of
those producing countries. The foreign debt of such developing-producing
countries and the falling prices of commodities are directly linked to the
economic dependency of these countries on income generated by drug
production.
In a recent United Nations report, the world organization noted:37
These bellwethers of the world economy in the 1980s - debt, falling
commodity prices, poverty and drug trafficking - are interconnected
and mutually reinforcing. The decline of prices for commodities like
sugar (64%), coffee (30%), cotton (32%) and wheat (17%) between
1980 and 1988 motivated farmers to turn to cash crops like the coca
bush and the opium poppy to avoid economic ruin. At the national
level, the export of illicit drugs often took up the slack in foreign ex-
change depleted by falling prices for agricultural goods as well as for
minerals, including tin (down by 57% in the 1980-1988 period), lead
(28%), crude oil (53%) and iron ore (17%).
The situation was especially desperate in nations burdened with
external debt which needed to be serviced with scarce foreign ex-
change. Indebtedness and declining revenues from export commodi-
ties brought on internal budgetary deficits for many countries, and
debt-repayment guidelines demanded reduced spending in the public
sector. Under these conditions, attempts to stem the tide of drug traf-
ficking through strengthened law enforcement or increased social ser-
vices were effectively crippled. Programmes for replacing illicit culti-
vation with food crops or other legitimate cash crops, which had
achieved some success during the 1970s, suffered in the 1980s due to
falling prices for agricultural commodities. As farmers turned away
from food crops, the need for imported foodstuffs increased, further
weakening currency reserves and bringing about greater dependence
on foreign exchange inputs from drugs.
The constituent elements of the illicit drug economy are found in
highest concentration in the western hemisphere. Latin American and
Caribbean nations were hurt badly by plummeting prices for coffee,
sugar, tin and petrol, among others. Their combined foreign debt will
reach $429 billion in 1990 and is greater than that of any other region
in the world.
In the meantime, the burgeoning United States market for illicit
drugs was close at hand. Various estimates put its size at from $50
billion to $100 billion a year. Cocaine from South America holds the
lion's share of the market, but Mexico, Central America and the Car-
ibbean islands are involved as transit points for cocaine traffic as well
as the production of cannabis (marijuana). Cultivation of opium pop-
pies for heroin production also takes place in Mexico.
37. Drug Trafficking and the World Economy, supra note 25.
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The cocaine industry is a major employer in the three key nations
of Bolivia, Columbia and Peru. Estimates of the number directly em-
ployed range between 600,000 and 1.5 million. About three quarters
are farmers and leaf pickers; nearly one quarter are pisadores
(stompers) who mix leaves and raw chemicals like kerosene with their
bare feet; a few thousand work in clandestine laboratories processing
coca paste into refined cocaine and 1,000 or so, including cartel bil-
lionaires, direct import-export and finances. In addition, many more
people owe their livelihood indirectly to the multiplier effect on local
economies, although not as many as would be the case with legitimate
industries of the same proportions, since most of the locally retained
profits are spent unproductively on real estate, luxury goods, status-
symbol cattle ranches, private armies and bribery.
What are the returns on their labour for the 99% of the cocaine
work-force who grow coca and turn it into paste? A study of the peas-
ant farmers in the Hapare district of Bolivia, largely Andean Indians,
looked at the effects of integration into a cocaine economy. The coca
leaf boom took off in 1982-1983, at the same time that economic reces-
sion and a severe drought wrought havoc in the rural highlands. Bo-
livia's gross national product declined by 17% between 1980 and 1985,
per capita consumption fell by 30%, per capita income by 20% and
unemployment doubled. Terms of trade for farmers suffered from in-
flation of 2,800% in 1985 and 10,000% in 1986. In 1985, producers of
coca leaves could earn $9,000 from 2.2 acres, while those growing the
next most profitable crop, citrus fruits, were averaging only $500 from
plots of the same size.
Landless farmers and workers laid off due to the collapse of the
tin market found work as pisadores, earning wages six to eight times
higher than those for any other skilled or unskilled labour in the legal
rural economy. Despite the immediate benefits, including sheer eco-
nomic survival, there has been a high price to pay. The cost of living,
once relatively low in Chapare, rose to greater heights than in any
other section of Bolivia, eating away at earnings. Cash exchange re-
placed traditional forms of barter and mutual support that provided
stability and equity within Indian communities. Food crops such as
potatoes and maize were in uncharacteristically short supply due to
diversion of labour to coca.
As local development corporations did not receive revenues from
the illicit coca trade, investments in potable water, plumbing and elec-
trification were not made. The work of the pisador, involving the
treading of kersosene-leaf mashes throughout the day, day after day,
is unhealthy in the extreme. Finally there is the subjection of local
residents to intimidation and brutality - they are simultaneously
vulnerable to the coercion of criminal organizations and to police and
army crackdowns. For all this, the local population has become depen-
dent on the price of coca, which has been falling sharply since 1985.
An additional impact is the breakdown of tribal, communal and
co-operative rural organizations under pressure from traffickers and
affiliated terrorist groups. Conversely, in Bolivia and throughout the
Andean regions, those areas with the strongest local organizations
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have most successfully resisted submersion in the cocaine economy. 8
a. Case Study: The Heiron Economy
In its ability to addict consumers and generate multi-billion dollar
sales, cocaine is rivaled only by heroin. Heroin is a derivative of opium,
which in turn is processed from the sap of the opium poppy. A kilogram
of heroin has a wholesale value of about $400,000 in the United States;
cut to six percent purity, its value reaches $2.2 million. Shadowy warlords
operating inside the "Golden Triangle," a mountainous area where the
borders of Myanmar (formerly Burma), Thailand and the Lao People's
Democratic Republic come together, were estimated to be producing sixty
tons of heroin per year in the mid-1980's. Of these, twenty tons were di-
rected to European and North American consumers.
This indicates sales of tens of billions of U.S. dollars in Western mar-
kets alone (the remaining forty tons would be divided between sales in
Asia, where prices are considerably lower and purity is generally higher,
and caches held as hedges against confiscation or poor crop years for the
poppy). As is the case with cocaine, only a small percentage of total sales
accrue to the producing region. Finance and distribution of Golden Trian-
gle opium, morphine and heroin are handled by various outside consorti-
ums. Most of them utilize the freewheeling Hong Kong financial markets,
although Japanese criminal syndicates known as the Yakuza also have
become involved.
The dominance of the Golden Triangle in production of opiates has
been eclipsed in the last two decades by the "Golden Crescent," encom-
passing lands running through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. As social
upheaval and civil strife in Iran and Afghanistan in the 1980's disrupted
production and shipping, Pakistan became the world's largest source of
heroin. By 1984, European police concluded that seventy percent of the
world's supply of high-grade heroin came from that country.
The difficulty of substituting legitimate crops for the opium poppy is
indicated by a study conducted in the area around Mahaban Mountain,
in Pakistan's north-west Frontier Province. About 125,000 people live on
the ridges and valleys of the mountain, most of them cultivating plots of
land averaging only half an acre. The opium poppy has been the main
crop since the 1800's, when it was legally grown for export under British
colonial rule. Thin soil, steep slopes and small plots make profitable culti-
vation of any other crop difficult. Earnings for poppy cultivation are
roughly ten times higher than for tobacco and fruit. Crop substitution
programmes have encouraged alternatives such as wheat grown from
high-yield seeds, but the international price for the crop has been falling
during the 1980's. A relatively undeveloped regional infrastructure pro-
vides little opportunity for extra-agricultural income, and longstanding
38. Id. at 1.
VOL. 18:3
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTROL OF DRUGS
values of the local Pushtun people place a premium on landowning status.
In addition, pressure is exerted on them to continue poppy cultivation by
opium traffickers located in the town of Gandaf, at the foot of the moun-
tain. They provide credit to the farmers, intervene in legal disputes and
are said to operate well-armed private militias.
b. Case Study: The Crack Economy
In the mid-1980's, when the United States market for powder cocaine
was waning, drug entrepreneurs devised a product that resuscitated sales
and brought them to even higher levels: crack. This crystalline form of
cocaine can be smoked, producing an instantaneous although short-lived
euphoria. More importantly, in marketing terms, it could be sold as vial-
encased "rocks" costing from five to fifteen dollars each. Sales shot up in
low-income inner-city neighborhoods, where powder cocaine was too ex-
pensive to attract many customers. In these communities, where unem-
ployment is high, the education system in crisis and economic opportuni-
ties few, crack offers an avenue of psychological escape for users and a
source of income for sellers.
Burgeoning crack sales in urban neighborhoods gave rise to the image
of formerly impoverished youths turned dealers who earn fantastic sums
of money, sport expensive clothes and jewelry and cruise the streets in
luxury automobiles. A recent investigation of the crack economy in New
York City revealed that such benefits are obtained by only a handful of
dealers. For most of those in the crack trade, earnings are at the mini-
mum-wage level or below. In return, they work long hours and live under
the threat of violence from superiors or rival gangs.
At the same time, violence and criminality associated with the drug
and its distribution are taking a heavy toll on neighborhoods already in
the grip of economic stagnation.
Attempts to start neighborhood businesses are discouraged, schooling
is routinely disrupted, hospital emergency rooms overflow with victims of
overdoses and shootings, and residents with skills and ambitions which
could be put to use productively are wasted in the illusory pursuit of
quick profits from the drug traffic. 9
The economic dependency of producing countries on drug-produced
income which is spurred by the market prices of consuming countries are
the most fundamental aspect of this entire problem. But it has yet to be
addressed by the international community and particularly by the devel-
oped consuming countries.
6. The Crime Problem
It is unequivocally established that the problems of crime related to
drugs derive from the fact that drugs are illicit. As a result, the argu-
39. Id. at 2-4. See also Nadelmann, supra note 36.
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ments made by the proponents of decriminalization cannot be taken
lightly. This is particularly so because it is easily demonstrable that the
political will of states in creating an effective and integrated international
control scheme for the complete eradication and control of drug cultiva-
tion and traffic does not exist, nor is it demonstrated by the actions of
governments up to now. Similarly, the divisions between various interna-
tional organs, as well as the lack of direct enforcement powers given to
them, and the lack of a truly integrated international legal control and
implementation system, once again demonstrates the lack of will of states
to effectively control that phenomenon.
It is also well established that the national systems of criminal justice
have not been able to develop the types of mechanisms for bilateral and
multilateral cooperation in such a way as to render their international
cooperation effective. Internally, the national systems of criminal justice,
subject to their traditional divisions of law enforcement, prosecution, ju-
diciary, and corrections, with all the sub-systems or sub-administrative
and bureaucratic divisions that exist between them render these systems
ineffective at controlling the problem of drugs at the national levels, let
alone of being effective in controlling the problem at the international
level.
The problem of drug-related crime derives essentially from the
criminalization of the use of drugs. It must therefore be clearly under-
stood that the policy choice of criminalizing the use of drugs is predicated
on a moral-social judgment by a given society and by the international
community as a whole which contributes to producing these criminal out-
comes. While certainly deference must be given to the moral and social
policy choices of societies, it must also be re-examined in light of its inef-
fectiveness, as well as its costs. In short, if a moral-social choice is made,
but is ineffective, what good is it to make such a choice? This is not to
say that moral-social choices must be measured only on an economic cost
benefit analysis. In a society like the United States, for example, the ex-
penditure of an estimated ten to fifteen billion dollars a year on drug
control and the administration of justice as it relates to drug matters
must be weighed against other options. These options will, however, de-
pend on as yet uncertain facts. If, for example, the heroin user population
is 200,000 persons, that of cocaine 500,000 persons, and that of marijuana
1 million persons, would these numbers justify the saving of ten to fifteen
billion dollars in criminal justice costs devoted to enforcing their
prohibition?
Such a cost benefit analysis must also take into account all the
human costs related to crime victimization and the loss of human life as a
result of the criminalization process. An analysis of this sort may appear
callous to some and in particular to those for whom this type of activity
violates their sense of morality or social ethics. For them, it would be
similar to decriminalizing prostitution, obscene and pornographic mate-
rial or gambling. Nevertheless, what is particularly interesting is that in
all of these areas, just as in the area of drugs, there has been a substantial
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de facto decriminalization. This is particularly true with respect to mari-
juana in the United States and many other Western European countries.
Criminalization of drug usage has remained essentially a matter of
legal opprobrium with limited effectiveness in its application. Proponents
of decriminalization have amply made their case in that connection and it
is not the purpose of this paper to reconsider or re-examine these argu-
ments, but merely to highlight the problems of ineffective international
control which seems to ignore that the unfortunate reality will not be
cured by more spending and harsher penalties. 0 The various interna-
tional and national control systems will first need substantial changing to
render them effective in controlling the problem.
7. International Cooperation Modalities4 '
There are a number of international modalities which have been re-
lied upon in all aspects of international cooperation in crime-related mat-
ters. They are:
1. extradition;
2. judicial assistance and cooperation in the area of securing tangible
and intangible evidence;
3. transfer of criminal proceedings;
4. transfer of prisoners; and
5. recognition of foreign penal judgments.
It is interesting that so far these various mechanisms of international
cooperation have remained at a very primitive level. Only three countries
have enacted integrated national legislation on inter-state penal coopera-
tion: the Federal Republic of Germany,"2 Switzerland 4 and Austria.4 4
40. Bassiouni, Needed: A new approach to the war against drugs, Chicago Sun Times,
Oct. 28, 1988, at 46, col. 1.
41. See 2 M.C. BASSlOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE (1987); E.
MULLER-RAPPARD & M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTER-STATE COOPERATION IN PENAL MATTERS: THE EU-
ROPEAN CONVENTIONS (3 vols. 1987-88).
42. F.R. Germany, Gesetfiber die Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafrecht, (Act Con-
cerning International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters) of Dec. 31, 1982, entered into
force Jan. 7, 1983, BUNDESGESATZBLATT 1982, Teil I, No. 2071. (Federal Official Gazette 1982,
p. I, at 2071). The act replaced the German Extradition Act of 1929 and provides for com-
prehensive measures of extradition and other forms of mutual assistance in penal matters,
including execution of foreign sentences. See also 0. LAGODNY, DIE RECHTESSTELLUNG DES
AUSZULIEFERNDEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1987); T. VOGLE, AUSLIEFERUNG-
SRECHT UND GRUNDGESETZ (1970); Vogler, The Expanding Scope of International Judicial
Assistance and Cooperation in Legal Matters, DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE 287 (Band 66, Heft 3-4,
1986).
43. Entraide Internationale en Mati~re Penale (Swiss Federal Law on International Co-
operation in Penal Matters) Mar. 20, 1981, which also applies to international terrorism,
arts. 3(b) and 12.
44. Bundesgesetz vom 4. Dezember 1979 Uber die Auslieferung und die Rechtshilfe in
Strafsachen (Auslieferungs und Rechtshilfegesetz -ARGH) (Austrian Law on Mutual Assis-
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These integrated national approaches provide more flexibility than is
available in countries that use these modalities in an uncoordinated and
disparate fashion.
Most countries still believe that bilateralism is better than multi-
lateralism. Yet it is quite clear that 165 countries cannot all have the
same legal capabilities of being able to know of all of the other legal sys-
tems of the world, as well as the various requirements in order to process
such requests and to receive them and act upon them. Least of all, the
personnel necessary to staff such offices is either nonexistent or woefully
inadequate. That is not to speak of the technical personnel needed to
know the different languages in which such applications and requests are
made and received. In effect, there is a very primitive system of bilateral
and, in some cases, regional cooperation involving small staffs in the vari-
ous ministries of justice that deal with all these various modalities as well
as they can.
The problems here range from the macro to the micro. At the macro
level there are no integrated multilateral agreements that take into con-
sideration all these different forms of cooperation. As a result, each one of
these forms operates separately instead of being integrated together. An
appropriate analogy is that of a gear box and the ability to shift gears.
For example, if extradition cannot be granted because one country denies
extradition of its nationals, there is the opportunity to shift into the gear
of transfer of criminal proceedings, and then the individual would not
escape prosecution simply because nationals are not extradited by that
requested state. However, the separate compartments in which these
mechanisms are kept have largely reduced their effectiveness. Govern-
ment bureaucrats representing their governments at international and re-
gional organizational meetings are somewhat reluctant to go ahead with
making such a new step into integrating these mechanisms. Yet their ti-
midity is reflective of the same timidity that all bureaucrats and govern-
ment representatives have when they meet at regional and international
levels. The politics of international relations always seem to prevail over
the common sense and good judgment that jurists would have if they
were not subjected to those considerations which are due in large part to
the lack of a genuine and effective will by governments to engage in inter-
national cooperation. In short, governments would prefer to adhere to
rigid conceptions of national sovereignty and the ensuing jealousies that
result therefrom rather than to engage in effective international coopera-
tion. Thus, the will, as manifested by governmental conduct, does not
match the rhetoric.
At a different level, it must be noted that there are no new interna-
tional or regional organizations that have been created to operate in the
field of international cooperation in penal matters, though international
tance in Criminal Matters) BGBI.Nr. 529/1979. See also R. LINKE, H. Epp & R. FELSEN-
STEIN, INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHT (1981).
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cooperation has indeed increased.4 5 However, specific undertakings are
yet to be developed. For example, there could be regional informational
clearing houses for law enforcement cooperation and sharing of data and
information about international, regional and even local organizations en-
gaging in drug-related crime. At present there is no central database or
central office to provide technical assistance to one another. It would be
simple, for example, to establish in a given region a centralized library
containing all the laws and regulations of the different regional countries
concerning international cooperation in penal matters and criminal laws.
The library staff would be capable of providing such technical assistance
to the different requesting countries. Such a centralized legal reference
service would clearly have no political implications and no political liabil-
ities for the participating governments but would certainly provide an
enormous resource to the various government offices seeking to prepare
applications and requests for the various modalities of international coop-
eration in penal matters. Why such a central legal reference system has
not been established is another clear indication of the governments' lack
of interest in making effective use of these mechanisms. It might not be
the lack of will of governments, but the low level of imaginative thinking
of governments that prevent such basic and simple ideas from being im-
plemented. There are, of course, a number of proposals such as the estab-
lishment of an international criminal court and the establishment of re-
gional international courts yet to be implemented."' At the national level,
criminal courts can specialize in handling mechanisms for international
45. INTERPOL, however, has become consistently more involved in drug matters.
Groups like the "Pompidou Group" of the Council of Europe and the "Trevi Group" of the
European Economic Community have engaged in interchange of intelligence information.
The United Nations sponsored in 1989 a consortium of Heads of National Drug Law En-
forcement Agencies (HONLEA). The Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) has also become
more active. As stated in a recent United Nations report:
Regional co-operative agreements recently reached include those among the
governments of Central America in 1989, of five Eastern European countries in
1988, the Balkan States in 1989, five Nordic countries in 1987, four African
countries in 1989, and countries belonging to the South Asian Association for
Regional Co-operation (HONLEA report, 1989). Regional Co-operation is also
bolstered by the South American Agreement, the Colombo Plan, and the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of
American States.
See Law Enforcement and Drug Trafficking, United Nations Department of Public Informa-
tion, 12M at 2, DPI/1040C-40076 (Jan. 1990).
46. One of the proposed solutions advocated before the General Assembly in 1989, G.A.
Res. 44139, 4 Dec., 1989, and subsequently discussed at the 21-25 Feb., 1990 Special Session
is that of establishing an international criminal court. The idea for such a court has long
been advocated by this writer and others. See M.C. BAssIouNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987). The
International Law Commission at its 1 May - 20 July, 1990 session will examine this ques-
tion, as will a committee of experts organized by the International Institute of Higher Stud-
ies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa) in cooperation with the United Nations Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Branch, 24-28 June, 1990. The General Assembly's regular 1990
session will also consider the proposal.
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level cooperation, but unfortunately, none of these practical measures
have as yet developed. Once again, it is important to question the will of
governments to make more effective international cooperation.
8. Suppression of Illicit Traffic
As indicated above, the assumption that illicit traffic can be sup-
pressed is largely unfounded, since total or even substantial control of
supply or demand cannot be achieved.47 Furthermore, the international
narcotics control system has not developed the necessary international
legislative measures for effective control.
As stated above, international cooperation in penal matters depends
upon the voluntary compliance of states whose national systems of do-
mestic controls and inter-state cooperation are overburdened and limited
in their capabilities. National criminal justice systems are unable to cope
with both the domestic as well as the international dimensions of the
problem.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Over the years, international, regional and national efforts have only
resulted in more seizures of drugs, more arrests of drug offenders, more
arrests of drug users, more costs in law enforcement, and significant bur-
dens on the criminal justice systems. Worse yet is the added human and
social costs, particularly the increased levels and incidences of violence
and victimization. Yet production of drugs increased more significantly
than the number of offenders and users. The bottom-line remains nega-
tive, and that negative balance also is on the increase. Some see the ulti-
mate conclusion of this process as the decriminalization of the use of hard
drugs, much like the de facto decriminalization via nonenforcement of
marijuana usage in the United States and many Western European socie-
ties. Some countries, like the Netherlands, have embarked on that course
of conduct for over a decade. Others, like Switzerland and the Federal
Republic of Germany, have allowed certain areas of some cities to be free
from law enforcement activities. In Zurich's main park there is even free
distribution of needles to heroin addicts as a way of reducing AIDS and
other health hazards. While in Frankfurt an area of the city operates free
of police interference with the sale and use of drugs.
The overall approach to international control of drugs is woefully de-
ficient as is the national control in most legal systems of the world. It is
unlikely that the present trend of existing controls will succeed. Whether
or not the world community can think of a more integrated and effective
international system that would provide greater opportunities for the
47. Cf., Resource Book on Measures to Reduce Illicit Demand for Drugs (United Na-
tions, 1979); International Strategy and Policies for Drug Control (United Nations 1982);
Combating Drug Abuse and Related Crime, (United Nations Social Defence Research Insti-
tute, 1984).
VOL. 18:3
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTROL OF DRUGS
control of supply and demand, as well as for an effective system of sup-
pression of traffic, is very much in doubt. To suppress any form of traf-
ficking, one must assume the ability to control both supply and demand
or to control either supply or demand or, at least, to be able to disrupt
major trafficking networks. None of these exist. So how could there be a
continued criminalization if neither supply nor demand nor suppression
of trafficking can be effectively achieved?
My own conclusion is that the world community is at this point in-
terested in making an apparent "good faith" effort. But, after a period of
time, de facto decriminalization is likely to occur.
The schemes and scenarios for decriminalization are supported by an
objectively defensible cost-benefit analysis of the costs of drug control
versus results obtained.'8 Some of the research also attempts to quantify
the human and social costs and hypothesize as to what would occur in the
event of decriminalization. The outcome is clearly unfavorable to the ex-
istence of a controlled approach. However, no one can assess the human
and intangible social costs resulting from decriminalization. For others,
the effort at controlling the harmful effect of drugs should not be aban-
doned before genuine and effective integrated international and national
efforts are undertaken. They too are correct because such efforts have
never been undertaken, even though they are the common subject of po-
litical pronouncements.
The prospects for effective international controls are so remote, how-
ever, that one can only agree with the principle of control with the knowl-
edge that its effective implementation is unlikely, and one must consider
other alternatives. Neither control of supply or demand, or both, will ever
eliminate a problem which, by its very nature, cannot be totally eradi-
cated-history teaches us that much. The goal therefore has to be to con-
trol or limit the harmful consequences. But levels of social tolerance are
subjective and depend within each society on different factors, particu-
larly psychological perceptions based on value judgments, which will also
vary in time."9 A new approach must be found, if for no other reason than
it may be dictated by the exigencies of objective (and quantified subjec-
tive) cost-benefit analysis. The search may well be for a new balance be-
tween advocates of total criminalization and those of total decriminaliza-
tion. But in the final analysis, any new approach will have to depend on
the willingness of all states to cooperate effectively at many levels.
Whether it is possible to have faith in this prospect will depend on the
degree of one's optimism about a process which has for so long failed to
attain its avowed goals.
The experience of the 1960's in Western industrialized societies with
respect to marijuana is indicative. While I do not think that legalization
48. See Nadelmann, U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export, 70 FOREIGN POL'Y 83 (1988).
49. The War on Drugs: Is It Time to Surrender?, Report from the Institute of Philoso-
phy & Public Policy (Vol. 9, 1989).
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of the use of drugs will occur in the next quarter century, I would venture
to guess that decriminalization will nonetheless occur in a de facto sense.
This has been the experience with marijuana. It seems possible that the
same will occur with respect to the use of cocaine and heroin and heroin-
related products. Somehow, after major consuming societies have ex-
panded significant resources, which will be wasted under the present sys-
tem, there will soon come an implicit realization that the waste of such
resources is no longer a valid social and economic choice. The conse-
quence will be that consuming societies will become habituated to the use
of drugs by some of its members, just as those societies have become ha-
bituated to a certain level of crime, as well as to a certain level of damage
to the environment. As with all social ills, societies have a way of habitu-
ating themselves and adjusting to their existence. They merely lower their
expectations while increasing their levels of tolerance.
There is no doubt that an integrated series of strategies operating at
different levels can be developed nationally and internationally to cumu-
latively achieve a reduction of the levels of harms of this problem in order
to render it more manageable and more tolerable by the states directly
affected and by the world community as a whole.50 Most observers of this
phenomenon, however, would agree that these results are not likely to
occur. The only hope would seem to be a natural process of use reduction
that could occur as a result of greater worldwide awareness of the dangers
and harmful effects of drugs. Where governments have failed, perhaps the
good judgment of peoples all over the world can partially succeed. 5'
50. A World Ministerial Summit to Reduce Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Co-
caine Threat was convened in London on 8-11 Apr., 1990 and essentially urged reduction of
demand. See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 6218, 3 May, 1990, which
also contains the "Pomjudou Group" recommendations. Both the London Summit and the
"Pomjudou Group" meeting followed the same approach embodied in Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers Resolution (73)6, 19 July, 1973 on The Penal Aspects of Drug
Abuse, though without reference to it. This shows that no new ideas have been developed,
only old ones in new forms are re-argued.
51. See di Gennaro, Droga: Cultura Antica e Cultura Moderna, 6 TRIMESTRALE DI CUL-
TURA ED ESPERIENZE GIOVANILI 11 (1986), wherein he compares different "drug cultures" and
expresses the hope that the contemporary "drug culture" may be a passing fad.
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APPENDIX
The following figures have been released by the United Nations Divi-
sion of Narcotic Drugs. They indicate approximate quantities of drugs
which have been reported as seized from 1979 through 1988.
WORLD TOTALS OF DRUGS SEIZED
1. Cannabis Herb/Plants
1979: less than 10,000 tons.
1983: approximately 25,000 tons.
1987: over 50,000 tons.
1988: approximately 20 tons.
2. Opium
1979: approximately 60 tons.
1983: approximately 65 tons.
1987: approximately 50 tons.
1988: over 70 tons.
3. Heroin
1979: less than 3 tons.
1983: approximately 12 tons.
1987: approximately 17 tons.
1988: over 22 tons.
4. Cocaine
1979: less than 20 tons.
1983: approximately 50 tons.
1987: approximately 150 tons.
1988: over 175 tons.
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